In the quest for new solutions for regional security, West African states must increasingly look to national non-governmental organizations for support, says Nuria Grigoriadis, expert in peace issues at the Robert Bosch µÚÒ»³Ô¹ÏÍø.
The latest diplomatic efforts by Ghana’s new president, in office for the second time, inspire hope that a regional response to the steadily worsening security situation in West Africa can be found. In particular, John Mahama’s visits with the military governments of the Central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, show that dialogue is still possible, even after the coups that were staged there. With his involvement, Mahama is lobbying for a joint security policy, since individual states going it alone militarily has not served to weaken the jihadist groups in the region.
A regional response is all the more urgent as western countries, which traditionally have contributed greatly to security in the region, are changing their priorities: While the EU is focusing on Russia’s war against Ukraine and its own rearmament, the USA has turned its attention to the Indo-Pacific and China’s ambitions. And Russia and its mercenary groups operating in the region have not exactly improved the security situation. According to the United Nations and international human rights organizations, for example, in 2022 Malian troops together with Russian mercenaries carried out a massacre of Malian civilians in the central Malian city of Moura – an act that played into the hands of the jihadists.
After more than ten years of futile military measures – some with western support, some with Russian – it’s high time for regional cooperation that goes beyond purely militant approaches. Since the start of his second presidency in January, Mahama has made it clear that a rethink is necessary. Shortly after taking office, he met with his Malian counterpart to discuss the security situation and appointed a special envoy to restore relations with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These countries of the Central Sahel region had withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 2023, after the latter had sharply criticized the coup in Niger.
Along with Senegal, which was tasked by ECOWAS with persuading the Central Sahel countries to rejoin the economic community, Ghana is the next stakeholder striving to advance the dialogue in the region. But local actors involved in peace and development work must also be included in this exchange from the outset and aspects such as conflict prevention and management must be on the agenda.
Instead of tackling only the symptoms and with violence, the West African states must do more to address the causes, which favor the growth of jihadist groups, not least among them poverty, lack of prospects, and governmental neglect. The latter is primarily evident in the absence of state structures in many parts of the country – especially remote border regions –, where essential functions like security, justice, and the provision of social infrastructure are often not fulfilled.
National non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make a vital contribution to stability in West Africa – especially where armed groups are active. They can help reduce the negative interdependencies between lack of security, economic hardship, and social tensions. Some who work for these local organizations are themselves impacted by the conflicts and, as such, are profoundly acquainted with the largely complex causes and dynamics on the ground, not least in the marginalized border regions of the West African states, where government structures barely exist, if at all.
Local NGOs can be vital sources and conveyors of information for the governments of West Africa. Often, their staff enjoy the trust of the communities affected by violence, affording them access that is for the most part denied to state actors, especially the armed forces and police. In the border region between Ghana and Burkina Faso, for instance, local NGOs have developed a local early-warning system that provides rapid information by phone around any tensions or attacks in the communities. This way, the right local bodies can be alerted and included early on, in order to avoid greater conflicts or escalation.
Furthermore, NGOs can act as a link between civilians and local authorities. In the border region between Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire, they have used dialog formats to bring groups to the table who otherwise barely have contact. This has enabled farmers and herders in particular, who repeatedly clash – sometimes violently –, to break down their mutual prejudices. This amounts to important prevention work by the NGOs, as jihadist groups specifically exploit such social tensions to recruit new fighters.
Yet these local organizations work under very challenging conditions, notably in many cases being severely under-financed. Established organizations usually have it easier, as they are often well connected to international NGOs or even directly to state, multilateral, or private donors. But for smaller NGOs far removed from the main cities, these are often hard to reach – and with the changing priorities of many western donors, the funding situation is only set to worsen moving forward. Which is why it is incumbent upon the states in the region to expand their support for local organizations. Another talking point for Mahama when meeting his colleagues.